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The optimal pollution tax rate which maximizes the total social surplus is derived for 
Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly where product and factor markets are assumed to 
simultaneously imperfectly competitive. The optimal pollution tax rate is compared 
with the marginal value of the environmental damage. Three special cases are 
considered to elucidate the economic implications of the optimal rate.   


























     Cournot oligopoly has been extensively studied almost exclusively under the 
implicit assumption of perfectly competitive factor  markets(see Okuguchi and 
Szidarovszky(1999),Vives(1999) and Martin(2000) for the comprehensive 
surveys).However,oligopolistic firms procure, more often than not, factors of production 
from imperfectly competitive factor markets. Okuguchi(1998,2000) has analyzed 
Cournot oligopoly under the condition of imperfectly competitive factor 
market,i.e.Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly. Firms produce not only goods  but also 
bads(pollution) which damage environment. Pollution level can be controlled by 
government by imposing pollution tax on polluting firms.Some economists have 
analyzed the optimal pollution tax rate which maximizes the net total social surplus for 
Cournot oligopoly facing perfect competition in factor market(see,for 
example,Barnett(1980),Baumol and Oates(1980),Levin(1985),Okuguchi and 
Yamazaki(1994), Simpson(1995) and Okuguchi(2003)).A general finding is that the 
optimal pollution tax rate maybe higher,lower or equal to the marginal value of the 
environmental damage,the monetary value of the environmental degradation due to 
marginal increase in the total pollution level. 
     In this paper I will derive a general formula for the optimal pollution taxation 
within Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly without product differentiation,  for which 
both product and factor markets are assumed to be imperfectly competitive.In Section 
2,I will prove that there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium for oligopsonistic oligopoly 
under general assumptions,given the level of pollution tax rate. In Section 3,I will 
derive the optimal rate of pollution tax capitalizing on the existence result in Section 
2.The economic implications of the general result are ambiguous.I will therefore 
consider three special cases to elucidate them.Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.Existence of Cournot Equilibrium 
Suppose  n  firms that produce identical goods to sell in an imperfectly 
competitive market. Suppose also that they buy one kind of factor of production in an 
imperfectly competitive factor market. I will use the following notation. 
 2t:pollution tax rate per unit effluent. 
i y :output of firm i. 
j y Y Σ ≡ :industry output. 
p :product price. 
) (Y p p = :inverse demand function. 
i l :factor demand of firm i. 
i l L Σ ≡ :total factor demand. 
) (L w w = :wage rate. 
i π :profit of firm i. 
) ( i i i l f y = :production function of firm i. 
) ( i i i y g e = :emission of effluent of firm i. 
  ,total emission by all firms.  i e E Σ =
Throughout this paper I assume differentiability of the relevant functions up to the 
orders as necessary. I impose the following restrictions on the inverse 
demand ,wage,production and emission functions 
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I assume that all firms form expectations on other firms’ factor demands a la Cournot. 
Assume  .Then the first and second order conditions for maximizing (2) with 
respect to    are given by (3) and (4),respectively. 
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Before proceeding further,I introduce the following assumption. 
Assumption 2 : For all i 
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It is easy to see that (4),the second order condition, holds under Assumptions 1 and 2. 
Take into account the definition of L and Y to rewrite (3) as 
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This is an implicit function among the variables  and  L li, Y and the parameter 
t .Solving it with respect to  I obtain  , i l
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As the right hand side of (6) includes   as a component of Y,which is also dependent 
on  ,(6) is not a reaction function in the traditional sense of the word.It is introduced 
for the sake of simplifying the following existence proof.At this stage (7.1-7.3) are true 
if L,Y  and t are all considered to be parameters.Given t, the Cournot equilibrium 
industry output and factor demand are identifiable as the solution of the following 
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I must now introduce an additional assumption. 
Assumption 3: . 0 ) 1 )( 1 ( > − − − ≡ L Y Y L D ψ ϕ ψ ϕ                              ( 1 0 )  
As is easily confirmed,this assumption holds if the factor market is perfectly 
competitive.Suppose t to be given.Since 
 












the Jacobian matrix of F and G becomes a P-matrix under the above 
assumption.Hence,(8.1) and (8.2) are uniquely solvable with respect to L and Y in the 
light of the univalence theorem of Gale and Nikaido(1965).Let the solution be 
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The denominator of (12.1 ) and (12.2) is positive by Assumption 3. However, the signs 
of the numerators are indeterminate,which in turn leads to the indeterminate sign of 
dt
dli  . 
3.Optimal Pollution Taxation 
          I am now in a position to determine the optimal pollution tax rate which 
maximizes the total social surplus W . If both product and factor markets are imperfectly 
competitive,the net total social surplus is equal to the sum of the firms’ profits, the 
consumer surplus,the surplus accruing to the factor suppliers and the governmental 
revenue from the pollution tax minus the total value of the environmental damage 
caused by the total pollution, ,namely,   ) (E D D =
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Since all variables appearing on the right hand side of (13) are to be evaluated at the 
equilibrium,the total social surplus becomes a function of the tax rate in view of (11) 
and (6). Taking into account the first order condition (3) , I get the first order condition 
for maximum W as 
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A little calculation then leads to the following formula for the optimal pollution 
taxation.    
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where    is the marginal value of the environmental damage. As I have noted already, 
the sign  
' D
dt
dli  is indeterminate,so the optimal tax rate may be higher,lower than or 
equal to the marginal value of the environmental damage. 
          I now consider three special in order to clarify economic implications of (15). 
Case 1 :Cournot oligopoly.In this case,  ,hence  0
' = w
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which has indeterminate sign. Suppose that all firms be symmetric,that is,   
and   for all i. Then    for all i.As the pollution tax must reduce the value of 
E  ,  
f fi ≡
g gi = l li ≡
, 0 < dt
dE which leads to  . 0 < ≡ dt
dl
dt
dli Therefore, the second term on the 
right hand side of (16) becomes negative,showing that  '. D t <       
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which has ambiguous sign. However, if all firms are symmetric,   
0 < ≡ dt
dl
dt
dli .This leads to  ' D t <   as in the case of Cournot oligopoly. 
Case 3:Symmetric Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly   
     If all firms are symmetric and if,in addition, both product and factor markets are 
imperfectly competitive,  0 < ≡ dt
dl
dt
i dl , from which I get t ' D <  in the light of 
.   0 '




     In Section 2, I have formulated Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly with polluting 
firms facing imperfectly competitive product and factor markets.I have shown that 
given the level of the pollution tax rate, there exists a unique equilibrium under general 
assumptions. Capitalizing on this fact I have derived in Section 3 the optimal pollution 
tax rate which maximizes the total social surplus in relation to the marginal value of the 
environmental damage.In general, the optimal tax rate may be higher,lower or equal to 
the marginal value of the environmental damage. I have elucidated economic 
implications of the optimal taxation formula for three special cases,that is, Cournot 
oligopoly,Cournot oligopsony and symmetric Cournot oligopsonistic oligopoly. Finally,I 
note that if both product and factor markets are simultaneously perfectly competitive,the 
optimal pollution tax rate is,as is well known, equal to the marginal value of the 
environmental damage and that if there is only one firm,the optimal tax rate becomes 
lower than the marginal value of the environmental damage.   
   
 8 9
References  
Barnett,A.H.(1980),”The Pigouvian Tax Rate under Monopoly”,American Economic 
Review,70,1034-1041. 
Baumol,W.J. and W.E.Oates(1980),The Theory of Environmental Policy,Second 
ed.Cambridge University Press,Cambridge ,U.K. and N.Y.,U.S.A. 
Gale,D.and H.Nikaido(1965),”The Jacobian Matrix and the Global Univalence of 
Mappings”,Mathematische Annalen 159,81-93. 
Levin,D.(1985),”Taxation within Cournot Oligopoly”,Journal of Public Economics 
27,281-290 
Martin,S.(2002),Advanced Industrial Economics,Second ed. Blackwell 
Publishers,Malden,U.S.A. and Oxford,U.K. 
Okuguchi,K.and T.Yamazaki(1994),”Ad Valorem and Specific Taxes, and Optimal 
Pigouvian Tax within Cournot Oligopoly”,Keio Economic Studies 31,25-32. 
Okuguchi,K.(1998),”Existence of Equilibrium for Cournot Oligopoly-Oligopsony”,Keio 
Economic Studies 35,45-53. 
Okuguchi,K. and F.Szidarovszky(1999),The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-product 
Firms,Second ed.Springer-Verlag,Berlin,Heidelberg and N.Y. 
Okuguchi,K.(2000),”Comparative Statics for Oligopoly,Oligopsony and Oligopsonistic 
Oligopoly”,Journal of Economic Research 5,173-187. 
Okuguchi,K.(2003),”Optimal Pollution tax in Cournot Oligopoly”,Keio Economic 
Studies 40,,85-89. 
Simpson,R.D.(1995),”Optimal Pollution Tax in a Cournot Duopoly”,Environmental and 
Resource Economics 6,359-369. 
Vives,X.(1999),Oligopoloy Pricing,MIT Press,Cambridge,Mass. and London,U.K. 
 